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A formidable challenge most school leaders in South Africa face is to improve the academic results in state schools. In 
terms of their contracts, principals are accountable for the academic results as reflected in examination and test results for 
their schools. The National Department of Education (currently the Department of Basic Education) has made attempts to 
implement a performance agreement with principals and deputy principals, which would hold them directly and specifically 
accountable for the examination results. The article explores the proposed performance agreement and its potential 
influence on principals’ motivation to improve their own, and therefore also the teachers’ and learners’ academic perform-
ance. The focus group interviews conducted with principals and deputy principals indicate that principals do not want to be 
held accountable, because there are too many factors outside their control. They perceive a performance agreement of this 
kind as potentially demotivating because they do not feel they would be able to achieve the goals it sets. 
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Introduction, Background and Orientation to Assessment of Teachers’ Performance 
Education in South Africa, one of the emerging economies in the world, needs to be understood in its historical 
context. During the apartheid regime, the education system was characterised by huge disparities between the 
state schools provided by the Department of Education for the different racial groups. After the election of a 
democratic government in 1994, a new constitution was drawn up, which guaranteed all South Africans the right 
to basic education. A Plan of Action was drafted in 2003 by the then Department of Education (DoE) (since 
2009 the Department of Basic Education (DBE)) to provide access to free and quality basic education for all 
(DoE, 2003). However, although South Africa currently spends about 5.5% of its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) on education, and has attempted to implement wide-ranging educational reform, the educational 
landscape continues to be marred by huge disparities. According to Kanjee and Sayed (2013) and Taylor (2009), 
most state schools in South Africa are underperforming. In this context, underperformance reflects the level 
attained on the Grade 12 (school leaving) examination results, as well as Grade Three and Six literacy and 
numeracy (litnum) results. According to district officials in the Western Cape as well as North West Province, 
there are no official documents which provide criteria for underperforming schools. A general guideline is a pass 
rate of less than 60% or 70% in the North West province. The term underperforming is therefore a vague but 
powerful term, because it labels schools and principals, although the criteria for its application to them are not 
clear (Heystek, pers. comm., 9 December 2014). 
The DBE is committed to improving school performance. As has happened in many other emerging 
economies (Bush, 2012), it has identified leadership as a potential contributor to achieving the goal of quality 
education for all learners. The emphasis on the importance of leadership is reflected in the financial support the 
DBE provides, so that principals, deputy principals and heads of departments can register for the Advanced 
Diploma in Education Leadership (ACE). This ACE is offered at various universities in South Africa. DBE via 
the provincial departments of education pays their academic fees and travel costs and accommodation costs. The 
official vision for the programme was the development of a corps of education leaders, who apply critical 
understanding, values, knowledge and skills to school leadership and management in line with the vision of 
democratic transformation (DoE, Republic of South Africa, 2008). The pronounced expectation was that this 
program must be a ‘quick fix’ to the problems in education more broadly, for example, the underperforming 
schools as expressed by the National departmental representative in 2006 at the launch of the programme at the 
University of Stellenbosch, where I was present. The students for the ACE are selected from principals, deputy 
principals and departmental heads, since the aim of the programme is to develop principals and aspiring 
principals (throughout the rest of the article referred to as principals, because the heads of departments as well as 
deputies are included in the ACE). 
In general, the DBE feels it can hold school principals accountable for the performance at their schools. 
They all sign contracts that explicitly refer to their accountability for performing the tasks and functions 
expected of principals in the South African Schools Act of 1996, and the Personnel Administration Measures 
(PAM) (DoE, 1999). In 2003, the Department of Education introduced the Integrated Quality Management 
System (IQMS) process to measure what teachers are achieving. All staff members at schools (including 
principals) are required to complete the IQMS forms annually as part of this process. However, this system does 
not hold teachers accountable for the quality or success of their performance (as measured by whether their 
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learners pass or fail the subject they teach) (Mosoge 
& Pilane, 2014). No disciplinary or even specific 
developmental action is taken in cases where 
performance does not improve. The implementation 
of the IQMS has therefore not proved to be an 
effective means of motivating teachers to improve 
their performance (Mahlaela, 2012; Mbulawa, 
2012). To address the issue of the accountability of 
all teachers, including principals, the DBE drafted a 
document, the Performance Agreement (PA – used 
here in reference to the proposed performance 
agreement document) in 2011, for principals and 
deputy principals. This PA would hold them 
accountable for the performance of the teachers, and 
therefore also the learners’ examination and test 
results. As part of the process, necessary attempts 
were made by the employer (DBE) to negotiate the 
PA with the teacher unions, as representatives of the 
principals and deputies in the Education Labour 
Relations Council (ELRC). This initial document, 
drafted in June 2011 was not accepted by the 
teachers unions. Since then, the DBE has developed 
a more comprehensive document, the Quality 
Measurement System (QMS) (South African 
Council for Educators (SACE), 2013), which 
includes all teachers, such that it is not limited to 
principals and deputy principals. Nielsen (2014) 
points out that this trend towards stricter 
performance management and goal-orientated 
outcomes by governments is international, and not 
unique to South Africa. Although the role of the 
unions in schools makes the implementation of PAs 
a more complex process here, it still falls within the 
global trend to more visible, performance-driven 
assessment. The South African Democratic 
Teachers Union (SADTU), by far the biggest 
teachers’ union and thus the most powerful 
roleplayer in negotiations on teachers’ benefits, 
remains strongly opposed to the principles of 
accountability and potential disciplinary action in 
PAs. In its view, this is not in the interests of its 
members. 
The initial proposed PA was never 
implemented, although the national Minister of 
Education (Gernetzky, 2012) publically announc-
ed the proposed PA. However, principals in the 
Western Cape Province did feel the potential 
threat of the proposed PA. As early as 2012, the 
Western Cape Province, one of the nine provinces 
of South Africa, wanted principals to sign the PA, 
even though the DBE and the unions had not yet 
reached agreement. Had principals signed this, it 
would have meant that disciplinary steps could be 
taken against them if the examination results at 
their schools did not improve. Later in this article, 
the focus group interviews and the analysis will be 
used to explore the principals’ responses to the 
possible implementation of the PA. 
The project described in this article stems 
from a desire to explore principals’ responses to 
what they had heard about the PA. This article 
explores their responses in order to raise issues 
about such agreements, and their possible effect 
on school leaders’ level of motivation in South 
Africa. The question framing this research is: to 
what extent do principals perceive the PAs as 
motivational in the process of improving quality 
education? The question is premised on the notion 
that motivation is what moves one to participate in 
an activity, and is what affects one’s desire to 
continue with the activity (Enhanced Motivation, 
2004). The research draws on motivational theor-
ies to explore whether a PA could be a means of 
motivating principals to improve the quality of 
education in most underperforming schools. It 
should be noted that the performance management 
policy has not been implemented, and that the 
participants in the research did not have any first-
hand knowledge of it. The research arises from 
my personal experience with principals during 
discussions in different forums. The anecdotal 
evidence I gleaned suggested that these school 
leaders had reacted negatively when they heard 
that a performance management process might be 
introduced. This will be discussed in more detail 
later in this article. 
It cannot be said that the DBE assumed that 
if the PA were accepted, improved performance 
would necessarily result. It is more accurate to 
speak of the DBE’s expectation (Fredericks, 2012; 
Gernetzky, 2012). This point will be explored in 
what follows. 
 
Performance Agreement as Potential Threat 
Motivated people are likely to perform better over a 
longer period, than people whose actions result 
from an agreement which is potentially threatening 
to them (Latham, 2007; Owens & Valesky, 2011). 
The proposed performance agreement (QMS) is an 
example of such a potentially threatening agree-
ment. The rationale for this assertion is that 
accountability requires measureable goals to be met; 
and therefore, these goal-driven agreements or 
control processes have the potential to motivate 
people to improve their performance level (Ryan, 
2012). However, for this to be true, those being 
assessed or appraised must feel they have a realistic 
possibility of achieving these goals (Reeve, 2009). 
Although there is not really an official crisis of trust 
in South African education system, Saunders, Dietz 
and Thornhill (2014) have argued that many indi-
vidual managers are struggling to manage positions 
of trust and distrust. The notion that a level of trust 
is important, resonates with McGregor’s X and Y 
approaches to people and management (Kressler, 
2003); if leaders do not trust those they lead, they 
tend to implement stricter control criteria and 
actions. This may explain why the national and pro-
vincial ministers of education and the directors 
generally feel the need for mechanisms to ascertain 
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whether their plans to improve the quality of 
education are achieving the desired goals and stan-
dards. 
However, as Sun and Van Ryzin (2014) 
indicate, goals must be measurable and realistic. 
The potential problem with the goals of the PA is 
that although the examination results are measur-
able, the input of teachers and principals are diff-
icult to measure. This compromises the reliability of 
the PA. A performance agreement of this kind thus 
focuses on the task, rather than the person 
(Crawford, 2009; English, 2008). Chen, Eberly, 
Chiang, Farh and Cheng (2014) refer to a patern-
alistic leadership (or rather governance) style, which 
may be said to typify the DBE’s over protective or 
“I know what is best for you” attitude towards 
principals and schools. The performance goals are 
predetermined and externally developed; in this 
case, the examination pass rates or litnum levels 
have to be achieved, regardless of the context and 
circumstances of the contracted principal. This type 
of ‘paternalistic’ PA may thus be described as a 
managerial and task-orientated approach to school 
improvement. 
DeNisi (2011) points out that the problem does 
not lie with the criteria or the content or the scale, 
but with the implied threat. When humans feel 
threatened, they revert to a defensive survival mode, 
and may lose the drive to develop the new ideas 
which are necessary to lead an underperforming 
school to sustainable improvement (Hallowell, 
2011; Kressler, 2003). Mosoge and Pilane (2014) 
indicate that performance management without 
provision for development is unlikely to motivate 
teachers to enhance their performance. Underlying 
the research on principals’ attitudes to the draft PA 
for principals, was the need to explore whether this 
would have a motivational or demotivational effect. 
In order for a PA to be motivating, the employees 
concerned need to feel that they can achieve the 
goals set out for them (Ryan, 2012). A determining 
factor is whether or not they feel that they have 
sufficient control over the contextual factors, 
intrinsic and extrinsic. For this reason, it is argued 
here that PAs or performance contracts should not 
have deterrent or other negative effects. 
These insights have direct implications for 
the way the performance agreements are im-
plemented or applied, as well as for the import-
ance of making the purpose clear. A performance 
agreement may become a positivist, bureaucratic 
and inhuman process if employees are assessed 
against examination result targets, without regard 
to the context of the school and community. 
Performance agreements and appraisal are assoc-
iated with goal path and expectation motivational 
theories (Pintrich & Schunk, 2002; Sheppard, 
Canning, Tuchinsky & Campbell, 2006). It is not 
clear from the draft of the PA whether or not the 
intended purpose was to motivate principals to in-
crease their performance, but the Minister’s state-
ment indicated it was rather a managerialistic app-
roach to keeping people accountable, rather than 
to motivating them in their performance. 
 
Performance Agreements and Motivation 
DeNisi (2011) emphasises that for assessment to be 
a performance-changing instrument, the process and 
criteria and purpose of the appraisal must be fair, 
valid and reliable. Otherwise, the appraisee will 
change his or her behaviour only to a limited extent, 
if at all. The performance agreement, including the 
document used, for example the IQMS or proposed 
PA, has to be seen as legitimate and acceptable by 
the appraisee. A performance agreement is not in-
herently problematic if the agreement is properly 
negotiated, and accepted by all involved. Nielsen 
(2014) emphasises the positive potential influence 
of PAs, when he states that when performance 
feedback shows that performance falls short of 
aspirations, this provides a signal to the organisation 
that some sort of change is required. Chen et al. 
(2014) in China, as well as Moreland (2009) in 
England and Wales, discuss the motivational factor 
of performance appraisal, and indicate that the level 
of trust between the people involved in the PAs is 
an important factor in making performance app-
raisal a positive process. What is most important is 
not the control, assessment, appraisal, inspection, or 
whatever the actual process is labelled, but the 
motive behind the control functions it enacts. A 
school-related PA must be more than an account-
ability tool; it must also make provision for the 
development and support of the principal (Cardno, 
2012). McGregor’s X and Y approaches to people 
and management (Kressler, 2003; Maslow, 1998) 
offers a way of understanding the philosophic base 
that underlies PAs or appraisals. Although, like 
most social theories, McGregor’s theory has been 
subjected to a great deal of criticism, it remains 
useful to the current argument, where his basic 
assumption is that there are two contrasting views 
that one may apply to the process: one is that people 
are inherently not driven to work hard (theory X); 
and the other is that people are highly motivated and 
dedicated (theory Y). Theory X implies a lack of 
trust, and hence, a “must know and control” 
attitude, which centralises PAs as vital. However, 
theory Y leads to a very different attitude. 
Principals, for instance, would be seen as 
professionals who do not need to be controlled and 
managed by means of PAs in the same way as 
workers involved in forms of industry. Subscribers 
to this view would see intrinsic motivation as 
preferable, because it is more likely to provide a 
longer-term solution to the need to provide quality 
education than a threatening control process (James, 
2005; Latham, 2007). Moreland (2009) concurs that 
in England and Wales, a positive attitude to the way 
teachers are treated makes the performance process 
4 Heystek  
a positive experience. This is very different from the 
South African context, where a theory X approach 
is taken towards principals. 
The job description in the contracts principals 
sign at state schools explicitly states that they are 
accountable for the quality of education in their 
schools. Knapp and Feldman (2011) refer to this as 
internal accountability or internal motivation. Ex-
ternally driven accountability, however, is more of a 
matter of compulsion, where the person involved 
meets requirements due to a sense of legal 
obligation. Expressed in simple terms, people may 
feel that I do not really believe in performance 
process, but because legislation requires that I must 
do a thing, I will therefore (or, I must) do it. 
Another problem with a performance agree-
ment is that it is applied according to a one-size-
fits-all policy. According to Sun and Van Ryzin 
(2014), there is sufficient evidence to show that an 
individual’s personality, attitude and values, as well 
as contextual factors like teachers and the socio-
economic environment, can make a difference to the 
approach taken to implementation, and the con-
sequent success or failure of any performance 
system. Moreland (2009) stresses that when per-
formance management is experienced, as at least 
partly focused on individual as well as organisation-
al management and goals, the participants feel 
positive about it. Sun and Van Ryzin (2014) 
indicate that in the United States of America (USA), 
performance management is correctly implemented, 
which includes a positive relationship between the 
leader (or employer) and employee. There is, 
therefore, the possibility that principals in South 
Africa could be motivated by a PA that is app-
ropriately managed and implemented. However, as 
Sun and Van Ryzin (2014) point out, performance-
related data should not be an end in itself: the 
process should allow principals to evaluate how 
much progress their leadership has achieved over 
time, help them to make better decisions, and adapt 
to new priorities or needs, so as to bring about the 
desired improvement. 
Martin and Dowson (2009) define motivation 
as a set of interrelated beliefs and emotions that 
influence and direct behaviour. For this reason, PAs 
may be expected to fulfil a few basic functions: 
first, to ensure that the work being done meets the 
minimum requirement of quality or predetermined 
goals. Secondly, such an agreement may serve as a 
motivational factor to workers, because they may 
earn more money, or some remuneration or, pref-
erably, feel inherently motivated if they achieve the 
agreed standards or even surpass the required 
standards. Martin and Dowson (2009) argue that 
relationships affect achievement motivation by 
directly influencing the constituent beliefs and 
emotions of motivation. Interpersonal and intrapers-
onal relationships will negatively influence motiva-
tional levels if principals are made to sign agree-
ments. However, a positive self-relationship, but 
also positive relationships with superiors and 
followers, may be significant motivational factors 
that minimise the potential demotivational factors in 
these agreements. Thirdly, PAs may also serve as a 
smoke screen for employees to eradicate un-
productive workers, as one of the participants in this 
research indicates. 
A further problem is that there are too many 
factors, both external (environment or fellow human 
beings) and internal (personality, values), that could 
influence the motivational levels of a person; or 
constrain the ability of a person (such as principal) 
to motivate all the teachers in a school simul-
taneously and to the same level, to get them to 
improve their performance significantly (Kressler, 
2003; Sheppard et al., 2006). Each individual, as a 
cognitive, emotional and values-driven entity, thus 
needs a specific kind of motivation to make him or 
her ‘move’ to achieve or do what is expected. 
External factors, such as the circumstances, also 
determine the kind and level of motivation needed 
(Pintrich & Schunk, 2002). These include the 
school’s socio-economic environment, or the infra-
structure of schools, which often lie outside a 
principal’s sphere of influence. These factors may 
significantly affect the academic achievements of 
learners in the school (Reeve, 2009; Ryan, 2012). If 
the principals feel that there are external factors that 
are beyond their control, which will prevent them 
from achieving certain performance objectives, they 




The research employed a constructivist and 
interpretative perspective. In this qualitative app-
roach, the participants construct their own reality, 
perceptions and interpretations of what is happen-
ing, what they are experiencing, and what they 
know. This construction is influenced by the partici-
pants’ own personal reality, context and personality 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000). They con-
structed their understanding of the PA from what 
they had heard from different sources, exempli 
gratia (e.g.) newspapers, friends, unions and depart-
ments of education. In this research, little of the 
information had been gained from viewing the 
proposed document itself, but is rather based on 
second-hand information or discussion. This does 
not make the perceptions linked to their lived 
experiences of the participants less valid. Lived ex-
perience refers to how a person experiences a 
situation, which directly or indirectly, consciously 
or unconsciously, influences their perceptions about 
the specific issue, which in this case is the proposed 
PA (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013). The participant’s 
own constructed reality is how they “create forecast 
events and rehearse situations before the actual 
event occurs” (Cohen et al., 2000:337), which 
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again, in this case, is the potential influence on their 
motivation and performance level. Although the 
performance appraisal was not implemented, the 
participants experienced what may happen if the PA 
may be implemented. The participants were 
confronted by the possibility to sign a PA which 
might have a potentially negative influence on their 
work as they heard the Minister of Education said. 
Most, if not all of the participants came from 
underperforming or low-performing schools, as 
identified by the Western Cape Department of 
Education. Although most of the principals were 
working in the Western Cape, a province which 
generally performs very well (DBE, Republic of 
South Africa, 2013); the schools are located in rural 
and poor socio economic and previously oppressed 
communities, which historically tend to form the 
backdrop for most of the underperforming schools 
in South Africa (DBE, Republic of South Africa, 
2011). A convenient sampling strategy was applied 
to select the participants. The sample included the 
school leaders, who would have been directly 
influenced by the PA if it had been implemented, 
namely the principals, deputy principals and heads 
of departments. The purposive and convenient sam-
pling was not conducted to determine if these 
groups of participants had differing perspectives on 
the PA, but rather to ascertain a perspective from 
the leadership group; hence they were included in 
the groups as equals, and not as representatives of 
the different levels of leadership in schools. 
A convenient sampling method was applied, 
because the participants were conveniently avail-
able. It was also purposive, because the participants 
in the Western Cape already had information that 
the performance would be implemented in their 
province, even while the national agreement was 
not yet signed. Group D was purposively selected, 
because they are from another province and also 
had postgraduate qualifications in education 
leadership. The purpose was to determine if they 
had similar perceptions about the proposed PA. 
They were also conveniently available, since they 
were the part time lecturers for the ACE pro-
gramme. The participants in groups A, B and C (see 
Table 1) were selected from principals and deputy 
principals in the process of gaining a leadership 
qualification at a university. The members of Group 
D were part-time lecturers presenting courses in a 
leadership qualification, but they were all full time 
principals and deputy principals. They were selected 
because of their position as school leaders, and not 
as lecturers. The fact that they already had either a 
master’s or doctoral degree made them a unique 
group of principals and deputies, who could offer a 
different perspective. 
It could be argued that groups A, B and C 
constitute a captive audience. However, these parti-
cipants, who voluntarily registered for the academic 
programme, can also be described as “knowledge-
able”. Their decision to register for the programme 
is an indication of their own need for development 
and their potential interest in managerial issues with 
regard to their own and their school’s performance. 
The participants explained how they saw, felt, 
and experienced the announcement of the proposed 
PA, and what they expected the implications to be. 
From one perspective, their views may be seen as 
biased. However, this is not an issue here, since the 
research is concerned to reflect their reality at that 
time (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché & Delport, 2011). 
 
 
Table 1 The focus groups 
Group A  Five students (principals) who live about 400 kilometres from the capital city of Cape Town. The 
centre of this area is a large town in surrounding rural areas. 
Group B Eight students (six principals and two deputy principals) from a large town or its adjacent rural 
areas, 200 kilometres from Cape Town and about 200 kilometres from where Group A live. 
Group C Five students (three principals and two deputy principals), who live in a small, rural town and in 
its rural environs, more or less midway between the two other towns, and about 180 kilometres 
from Cape Town. 
Group D Three part-time lecturers (principals) who live to the north of the country, about 1,800 kilometres 
from Cape Town. All had the minimum qualification of a master’s degree. 
Group E Nine principals from the Executive of South African Principals Association (SAPA) Western 
Cape. 
 
The participants from Group A, B, C and E 
were from the Western Cape, which is regarded as 
one of the two best academically performing 
provinces (DBE, Republic of South Africa, 2013). 
The members of Group D were selected on the basis 
of convenience. I had the opportunity to participate 
in the presentation of the leadership programme at 
another venue in the country. These principals and 
deputy principals were part-time lecturers, who 
helped to present the programme. They were diff-
erent from the other groups in that they had higher 
academic qualifications; all of them had at least a 
master’s degree, and some had a PhD degree. 
The participants of group A and B were 
selected from the 200 students attending the 
academic programme; those in Group C were 
selected from amongst 25 students attending the 
programme at this venue; and those in Group D 
were selected from amongst 24 part-time lecturers. 
They all volunteered to participate after they had 
been informed as to the nature of the research 
project. The interviews were conducted after the 
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classes ended at a convenient venue for the 
participants. Since a large number of students had 
volunteered to participate, I decided to work with 
the participants who arrived at the agreed venue the 
next day. 
The ethical requirement to explain the pro-
cedures in detail was met. In all the cases (except in 
the case of the SAPA principals), I was either their 
lecturer in the programme, or their former lecturer, 
at different levels in Education Management and 
Leadership programmes. I therefore acknowledge 
that they may have been influenced by my presence, 
or by the ideas I had presented to them during the 
programme. I attempted to ensure sufficient validity 
of the information they provided, by emphasising 
that I wanted them to give their own opinions. I also 
ensured that I did not ask any leading questions, and 
that I even challenged some of their statements 
when it seemed that the principals might be 
pandering. 
Focus group interviews were the means of 
gathering the data, with semi-structured interviews 
as the data gathering tool. This gave the participants 
the freedom to discuss the issues, but all of the 
groups were given a basic predetermined set of 
questions as a discursive guideline. Stewart, Sham-
dasani and Rook (2007) indicate that focus group 
interviews are preferable to individual interviews, 
because they give the participants the confidence to 
speak their minds openly. They are also able to 
draw on each other’s ideas, making the discussion a 
building process of gathering data. De Vos et al. 
(2011) indicate that participants can also support 
each other, and thus, can emphasise the importance 
of a particular point; but they could also disagree 
with each other, which is an indication that the issue 
was as contentious as the project assumed it to be. 
The focus group is also an ideal forum in which to 
construct reality, since differing opinions were 
sometimes expressed, allowing a deeper under-
standing of the theme to be reached. During the 
focus group interviews in this research, I ensured 
that a single person did not come to dominate the 
discussions, since that could have prevented all the 
participants from voicing their views, and thus have 
influenced the data collected. Certain participants 
were specifically prompted to give their opinions, 
so as to allow all voices to be heard. The discussion 
during the focus group interviews was thus a 
developmental process, capturing a communal con-
struction of reality with regard to the proposed PA 
document (Stewart et al., 2007). 
The interpretative data analysis was used on 
that data which captured the direct voices of the 
participants, reflecting their construction of reality. 
This reality was then interpreted against the theory 
and existing knowledge related to the issues add-
ressed in the project. The quotations in this article 
were chosen because they represent the con-
struction of the group, rather than a single person’s 
ideas. 
In the following sections, I draw on the data to 
discuss the issues addressed by the participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Principal’s Knowledge and Perceptions of the 
Proposed Performance Appraisal 
The official negotiations on the proposed PA took 
place in the ELRC between the DBE and the 
unions. From the comments of the principals, it 
seems that neither the DBE nor the unions comm-
unicated with the principals about the PA and its 
possible implications. Although the majority of the 
principals had heard something about the PA, few 
of them had seen the draft PA, or been given any 
official information about it. In the interviews, the 
participants expressed their particular concern that 
the Western Cape wanted to implement the PA 
before there had been public or interest group meet-
ings to clarify all the issues it raised. The partici-
pants in the SAPA (Group E) had had the oppor-
tunity to discuss the document in detail, because 
they had been asked to give official feedback to the 
Western Cape Department of Education (WCED), 
as well as to the national DBE. The SAPA partici-
pants said they did not have a principled objection 
to such a document or to the process involved, but 
they felt that there were many problems with the 
current form of the document. They too expressed 
their concern that the WCED wanted to pilot the 
PA, with the blessing of the DBE, although the 
official agreement had not been signed in the 
ELRC. In fact, agreement had been reached in the 
ELRC in December 2011 that the document had to 
be revised by the DBE before the unions, especially 
SADTU, would discuss the issue again. 
One of the principals in Group B, who is 
actively involved in SADTU, indicated that he had 
been given information about the PA by the union. 
A few other principals intimated, after some 
hesitation and a short discussion among the 
members of the group, that the PA had been men-
tioned in passing at information sessions organised 
by the local districts. In their view, neither the DBE 
nor the WCED seemed to have a structured plan to 
inform principals about, or to promote the imple-
mentation of the PA. Most principals described their 
knowledge about the PA as information that they 
obtained ‘via the grapevine’. A principal (an active 
union member) in Group D mentioned that at a 
union meeting “they just touched on the document” 
about the PA, but there had not been a specific 
meeting to inform them or discuss the possible 
implications. Another principal in this group (not 
actively involved with any union but with a Phil-
osophiae Doctor (PhD) in Education management 
and policy), first read about it in a newspaper, and 
then heard about it in her district. 
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A Group D principal (active union member) 
summed up how the group had felt when they heard 
that the PA might be implemented: 
[…] I think it brought us a little bit of fear, because 
it is not clear what will happen to you […] if you 
underperform. Your performance is based on [a] 
number of stakeholders, like the parents and 
governing body, learners, yourself and teachers; 
and it is easy to be sabotaged. For example, if the 
governing body does not want to improve the 
buildings, […] you as a principal [may nonetheless] 
be measured on the [state of the] buildings.i 
A principal working on his PhD (Group D) research 
commented: “[I]t was a mixed feeling, because 
there was a lot of uncertainty, and I thought, we will 
get clarification about it”. One of the Group A 
principals had this to say: 
To me, it is a threat, especially [to those of] us in 
[…] disadvantage schools. We do not have 
resources, and therefore our conditions are 
different […] and therefore we have problems. I do 
not think we can be treated [as] previous Model C 
schools [are treated]. The principals and deputies 
may lose their job, and that [seems] unfair to me.ii 
The fear and uncertainty expressed above are 
discouraging to principals, where the PA can be 
seen to potentially undermine the basic human 
needs of safety, as indicated by Maslow, because 
they may lose their work (Aycan, Kanugo & 
Mendonça, 2014). Most of the participants felt that 
there was limited motivational value and power in 
the PA. One of the principals in Group D explained 
their feelings about the PA as follows: 
It [the PA] is a threat, because we think it will be 
the same as with the directors – if you do not 
perform, you will be recalled (25:10). [In the South 
African context ‘recall’ means that you are removed 
from a post and either employed at another school 
or in a district or circuit office]. 
Group B and C commented that the PA was not 
motivational, because teachers might be empowered 
to “sabotage” the principal. In this kind of situation, 
teachers might purposefully undermine the princi-
pal’s leadership and efforts to improve the school, 
which could ultimately even lead to the dismissal or 
replacement of the principal. That is another 
indication that principals felt factors outside their 
control that could have a negative influence on their 
future careers if they signed the PA. 
 
The Performance Agreement as a Potential 
Motivational and Accountability Tool 
Most participants did not perceive the PA as 
potentially motivating. They mentioned external 
factors outside their control, which made it im-
possible for them to feel they could take respons-
ibility for the personal performance of each teacher, 
and by extension, for the examination results of the 
school. The participants mentioned all the usual 
hindrances to performance, such as lack of facilities, 
teachers’ (possibly limited) qualifications, the learn-
ers’ level of ability, and (possibly detrimental) socio 
-economic conditions. 
Significantly, most were adamant that external 
motivational factors – for example, an increase in 
their salary – were not necessarily important 
motivational factors. In their view, for money to be 
a motivational factor; all the teachers at the school 
would have to share in any financial benefit. That 
would have to go along with the teachers’ willing-
ness to share in the consequences should the school 
not perform. The principals were under the im-
pression that the national department of education 
had not made the additional funds necessary to 
reward all. 
The participants also mentioned other external 
motivational factors that would have a motivational 
effect on them, and would empower them to 
encourage teachers to embrace development, such 
as better facilities at the school, and better support 
from the departmental officials at the local level. 
This would be a more effective means of getting 
them to work harder than a PA, aimed at forcing 
them to work harder. They also mentioned the 
important role parental support could play. External 
motivational factors can therefore not be discarded 
as potential shorter-term motivational factors. 
Most of the participants did not believe that 
the PA would be a powerful means of inspiring the 
principal, and most of the staff members, to im-
prove their own performance. On the contrary, the 
PA was perceived as an action which might have 
very different consequences from those envisaged 
by the different departments of education initiating 
this process. The principal’s internal motivation 
(Knapp & Feldman, 2011) were not addressed, 
because they said that the PA would not provide 
them with any power to use, if and when teachers 
did not meet the agreed levels of performance. The 
Group D principals also said that their knowledge 
did not give them total power, but noted that it did 
help them. 
One of the most important factors which 
militated against the principals’ feeling that they 
should be held accountable for the quality of the 
performance of teachers and the academic achieve-
ment of the learners, was the teachers’ unions. The 
Group D principals put it this way: 
We as principals are exposed (by the PA), because 
you know, the teachers are protected by the unions; 
we may be recalled, but because of the union’s 
power, an underperforming teacher will [stick] with 
you forever. [Author: underperforming teachers will 
rarely or never be disciplined or have formal action 
taken against them].iii 
 
Concluding Comments 
As an emerging economy, South Africa needs to 
raise the quality and level of the education provided 
to its future citizens. In order to manage this 
process, the DBE seems to use a neoliberal and 
managerial approach, adopted from countries in the 
developed world (Apple, 1999), rather than a 
progressive management process that would em-
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power local school leaders. In particular, it has not 
taken sufficient account of the contextual con-
straints in the school environment. 
In general, the participants’ initial reaction to 
what they had heard about the PA was that it 
represented a threat, rather than a motivation. Their 
perceptions were based on the view that the locus of 
control was not in their hands. They saw themselves 
as unable to achieve the required goals, which 
would threaten their work and position (Latham, 
2007; Ryan, 2012). The potential motivational in-
fluence of goals as motivation (Ryan, 2012) was 
thus negated by the principals’ sense that they 
would be unable to achieve these goals, due to 
constraints over which they had no control. 
Negative emotions have a strong influence on 
the motivational level (Martin & Dowson, 2009). In 
this case, the proposed PA offered few, if any, 
incentives for principals. According to the 2011 
draft performance agreement document, there was 
no offer of a salary increase, or other reward, 
providing guidelines for performance (SACE, 
2011). Therefore, they viewed it as a control 
mechanism, that was likely to have a negative effect 
on them, and which was not likely to result in a 
sustainable improvement of education. 
It is important to note that the responses of 
most participants was based on informal or un-
official information, such as newspaper articles, 
information, or comments given on the radio, or the 
informal discussions of colleagues (grapevine). This 
speaks directly to the expectations of motivational 
theory. The expectations from the DBE that prin-
cipals must under all circumstances improve the 
quality of education and if they cannot do this, 
ought to be accountable for the low performance 
was too high. When a goal or expectation is too 
high and it does not seem achievable for the partici-
pants, it loses its motivational value (Pintrich & 
Schunk, 2002). Outcomes expectations (Reeve, 
2009) such as the proposed PA, can be valuable as a 
motivational factor if the person concerned ex-
periences the expectation as achievable, and if the 
effort involved to attempt to meet this will result in 
valuable outcomes aligned with the level of effort. 
The perceptions the participants cited in this 
research were based on the Minister’s comments, as 
well as their experience of the redeployment of 
underperforming district officials. When the 
Minster made the comment, their perception was 
that the actions of the Minister were an abuse of 
power (Guthrie & Schuermann, 2010) or the use of 
her power to manipulate principals (Owens & 
Valesky, 2011), because she seemed to have chosen 
to threaten the principals. They saw this as 
demotivational. Any potential motivational gains 
from the performance appraisal system were 
therefore negated. 
What seems plain is that the possibility of 
identifying realistic goals for individual schools 
based on their local context indicated in the 2011 
draft have been ignored, in favour of the “one-size-
fits-all” QMS, which is currently in the develop-
ment phase. Ryan (2012) refers to this influence on 
the principals as a blow to their ego. The principals 
felt they had to exercise self-control to work in the 
difficult circumstances and to motivate themselves 
and the teachers they oversee. Once they felt that 
their self-control was not effective, their ego was 
depleted and this effect is against any potential 
motivational value of PAs which further erodes the 
control principals have on the situation. Although 
the 2013 document might offer a more subjective 
assessment process, and be burdensome to admin-
ister, it might be a better means of determining both 
personal and school goals, and thus be more moti-
vational. 
Not all principals viewed the agreement 
negatively. This is strong indication that the PA 
need not be interpreted as inherently negative, or 
bad. Reeve (2009) refers to this as the contextual 
influence associated with the perceived ability to 
control the situation. Control, or in turn, a lack of 
thereof, can ultimately have a direct effect on 
performance. Most of the principals expressing this 
were from Group E, in which the majority of 
principals were at better performing schools. There 
were also a few principals in Group B, who 
expressed the view that although they were not 
performing well enough, they did have control over 
the circumstances in their schools. These principals 
did not see a PA as negative per se. They possess 
the personal and professional fortitude to face a 
potentially threating situation (Reeve, 2009; Ryan, 
2012). However, the attitude of most of the 
principals to the proposed policy seems to be an 
indication of a certain corrosive energy, which may 
ultimately erode the positive growth in the 
organization (Bruch & Vogel, 2011). It seems that 
the key issue for this group is not the PA itself, but 
the many factors outside their control that make 
them feel they cannot be held accountable for 
examination results. The significant influence of the 
unions on the principal’s experience of low control 
is explained by Sheldon (2010). The personal and 
emotional depletion over a sustained period of time 
is caused by being in a situation in which the 
problem of external control (in this case by the 
unions), is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. 
The influence of the unions makes it very difficult 
for principals to effect an improvement in the 
teachers’ performance, or in the learners’ academic 
achievements. This does not reflect well on the 
motives and actions of the unions in a democratic 
and open society. 
Although this research is limited in scope, it 
could prove valuable when PAs with principals are 
being considered. The DBE should take account of 
the union’s role as a powerful external influence on 
the principal’s ability to perform, and on account-
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ability when drafting a policy such as performance 
criteria for principals. From this research, it seems 
that PAs are unlikely to motivate principals to 
improve their own, as well as the performance of 
teachers and learners at their schools, if full account 
is not taken of these external contextual constraints. 
The powerful influence of SADTU on the potential 
influence of principals to improve the quality of 
education in their schools must first be negotiated at 
national level so as to alleviate the pressure from the 
union on the local principal. 
 
Notes 
i. Verbatim quotation was edited for the publication. 
ii. Verbatim quotation was edited for the publication. 
iii. Verbatim quotation was edited for the publication. 
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